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DIGITAL AUDIO TAPE TECHNOLOGY: A




The Japanese electronics industry is planning to introduce a major
new home sound recording system into the American market. The tech-
nological advancement is the digital audio tape (DAT) system.' The
system provides on tape the same digital quality sound found only on
compact discs (CDs). The appeal of the DAT system stems from the
fact that it is the first device offering the capability of recording digi-
tally -at home.3 Unlike analog tape technology, reproduction of music
* J.D., 1989, Washington College of Law, The American University.
1. See Harrell, Japanese Audio, STEREO REV., July 1987, at 48 (explaining that
DAT is the first major audio product to originate in Japan). DAT is the latest advance-
ment in digital audio technology. Id.; see also Birchall, Digital Audio Tape, STEREO
REv., Mar. 1987, at 57 (discussing the development of DAT); Dworetzky, A New Tape
to Record Your Favorite Numbers, DISCOVER, May 1987, at 14 (explaining DAT tech-
nology). The DAT system combines the technologies of compact discs (CDs), videocas-
sette recorders (VCRs), and computers. Id. DAT utilizes the same type of rotating
drum, containing twin recording/playback heads, employed in VCRs. Id. The rotating
drum spins rapidly to place large quantities of information on a four millimeter wide
tape. Id. The rapid spin of the drum slows tape speed, thereby reducing wear on the
tape. Id.
DAT machines employ a processing chip to convert sound into binary digits to pro-
duce the sound quality found on CDs. Id. The process slices the sound into small peri-
ods of time. Id. Each of these periods is converted "into binary digits that represent
volume, or amplitude, and pitch, or frequency." Id. The periods are then encoded onto
the tape. Id. The playback mode of the system converts each period into sound, and
combines the sound periods to recreate music. Id.
2. See supra note 1 (noting the functions of DAT). See generally Kristof, Slow
Start for New Japanese Recorder, N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1987, at D9 (explaining that
tapes played on DAT machines are smaller than current cassette tapes, yet hold two
hours of music); Wilkinson, What is DAT, and why are the record companies trying to
keep it away from you?, ROLLING STONE, Sept. 10, 1987, at 69 (comparing DAT
cassettes to videocassettes). A DAT cassette, like a videocassette, does not expose any
tape. Id. Buell, And You Thought Nothing Could Top Compact Discs, Bus. WEEK,
Aug. 11, 1986, at 67 (explaining that the small size of DAT cassettes may lead to the
development of portable and automobile DAT machines); Copeland, Clift & Anderson,
The Sound of Money, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 5, 1987, at 72 [hereinafter The Sound of
Money] (stating that DAT produces sound superior to the finest analog tape
machines).
3. Supra note 2; see Harrell, supra note 1, at 48 (explaining that the major appeal
of DAT is its recording capability).
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from a DAT cassette does not suffer any loss of fidelity." Furthermore,
DAT can generate unlimited copies that possess the same digital qual-
ity sound as the original.5
The proposed introduction of DAT into the American market has
provoked considerable debate.6 The recording industry fears that DAT
will harm the prosperous CD market.7 In addition, the digital recording
function of DAT is considered a threat to the economic interests of the
record industry and recording artists.8 As a result, the American Music
Industry (AMI) has commenced a campaign to stop, or at least delay,
4. See Dworetzky, supra note 1, at 14 (comparing DAT to conventional analog
tape format). Current tape recorders place electromagnetic signals of light and sound
waves onto a tape. Id. Damage to a tape under the analog format results in sound
distortions. Id. The DAT system, however, interprets distortions as binary digits. Id.
The patterns of the digits are screened by microchip. Id. This error correction system
interpolates between true digit patterns to recreate destroyed digits. Id. Finally, DAT
technology can mute distortions. Id.
5. Supra notes 1-4; see The Sound of Money, supra note 2, at 72 (explaining that
subsequent copies sound the same as the first copy because DAT converts sound into
binary digits).
6. See Green, The High Cost of DAT, DIGITAL AUDIO, June 1987, at 136 (stating
that DAT is a highly controversial technology in the audio field).
7. Kristof, supra note 2, at D9; see The Sound of Money, supra note 2, at 73
(noting that DAT is viewed as a competing technology); J. LARDNER, FAST FORWARD
9-16 (1987) (arguing that there is always a struggle between those introducing new
technology and those attempting to preserve and exploit existing technology); Buell,
Peterson, Fukushima & Port, Record Executives Are on Pins and Needles, Bus.
WEEK, Feb. 16, 1987, at 112 [hereinafter Record Executives] (stating that Philips
Corporation, a leading CD manufacturer, wants more time to profit from the CD mar-
ket); see also Buell, supra note 2, at 67 (observing that the Japanese electronics indus-
try contends that CD and DAT systems are complementary, not competitive).
8. See Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 69 (stating that record companies argue that
DATs will deprive them of legitimate profits and deny artists of rightful royalties). The
debate spurred Congress to consider a bill that could temporarily postpone the importa-
tion of DAT recorders unless they contained a scanning device designed to prevent
copying. Id. President Reagan, in his 1987 State of the Union Message, said he would
endorse a bill restricting DAT technology in order to minimize home taping. Id., citing
52 CONG. REc. S1187-1199 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1987).
Those who support restricted use of DATs argue that DAT is the most dangerous
threat to the record industry. Record Executives, supra note 7, at 112. A representa-
tive of the industry notes that unrestricted use could ruin and eventually eliminate the
record industry. Id. In the end, the public suffers because the industry will have less
money to provide incentives to new artists. Wilkinson, supra note 2, at 70.
Consumer-rights groups and the electronics industry reject the objections of the rec-
ord companies. Id. These groups contend that the record companies fear new technol-
ogy. Id. According to the proponents of unrestricted use, the fear is unjustified because
the record companies adjusted to cassette tapes and even profited from prerecorded
cassettes. Id.
See J. LARDNER, supra note 7, at 9-32, 305-20 (noting that movie studios feared the
introduction of the videotape recorder). The studios argued that the recording system
would cause losses in profits. Id. The video recorder, however, produces large profits for
the studios from sales and rentals of prerecorded movies on videocassette. Id.
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the importation of DAT technology." The AMI believes that the DAT
is merely a copying device that serves no purpose other than home tap-
ing.10 The AMI contends that DAT will facilitate unauthorized copy-
ing by consumers and commercial pirates and lead to reduced revenues,
lost royalties, and deprive the record industry of money to develop new
artists." The AMI also opposes the importation of DAT technology
because the Japanese electronics industry rejected an appeal by the in-
ternational record industry to support legislation that requires the in-
stallation of a copyright protection chip in DAT recorders. 2
9. See The Sound of Money, supra note 2, at 72 (stating that American record
companies are conducting intense lobbying campaigns). These campaigns have fostered
congressional debate concerning the introduction of DAT into the United States. See
Digital Audio Tape Recorders: Hearings on H.R. 1384 Before the Subcomm. on Com-
merce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the Committee on Energy and
Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-13 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 1384]
(statement of Donald J. Quigg, Assistant Secretary and Commissioner of Patent and
Trademarks, Department of Commerce) (debating in favor of restricting digital record-
ing devices from the American market until a congressional act requires the use of
copycode scanners); see also Digital Audio Recorder Act of 1987: Hearings on S. 506
Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Committee on Commerce, Science,
and Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1987) [hereinafter Hearings on S. 506]
(statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye) (stating that S. 506 proposes to protect the
intellectual property rights of prerecorded music from unauthorized tape recording).
Accordingly, Congress proposed a prohibition on the sale, resale, lease, or distribution
of digital audio recording devices without copycode scanner chips for three years). See
infra note 12 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of the copycode scanner
chip).
10. The Sound of Money, supra note 2, at 72. Record companies state that con-
sumers will use DATs for the sole purpose of copying records, tapes, and CDs. Id. See
also supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text (describing the recording function of
DAT).
11. See supra note 8 (noting reasons for record industry concern over the introduc-
tion of DAT technology); see also Woodmansee, The Genius and the Copyright, 17
EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY STUD. 425, 439 (1984) (noting that piracy caused financial dif-
ficulties for publishers in the eighteenth century). Publishers used profits from popular
books to compensate for the publication of works that were not likely to sell. Id. Be-
cause of the increase in piracy, publishers became hesitant to publish works that would
not produce substantial profits. Id. As a result, the public was denied access to a wider
variety of works. Id.
12. See The Sound of Money, supra note 2, at 72-73. The record industry endorses
the use in DAT machines of an anti-taping technology called "copycode." Id. at 72.
Under copycode technology, manufacturers record CDs with frequencies missing at
fixed intervals. Id. Manufacturers insert in DAT machines microchips that can pick up
the absent intervals. Id. The microchips register the drops in frequency and cause the
DAT machines to temporarily turn off. Id. Consequently, the finished recording would
contain gaps. Id.
The Japanese electronics industry rejected the proposition of the record companies.
Record Executives, supra note 7, at 112. Instead, the Japanese have developed the
system of "copy-guard" protection. Id. Under copy-guard protection, DAT machines
lack input jacks that enable them to link directly with CD players. Id. Sound must pass
through a conventional analog amplifier to copy a CD. Id. Therefore, the reproduction
of CDs under this system is not perfect. Id. The record industry, however, is not satis-
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Rapid advances in recording technology, such as DAT, pose formida-
ble challenges to the American copyright system."3 The resulting stress
on the system gives rise to fundamental questions concerning American
copyright jurisprudence.14 Much of the debate centers on whether ad-
fled with the Japanese proposal. Id.; see Hearings on H.R. 1384, supra note 9, at 5.
Section 3 of H.R. 1384 provides in pertinent part:
(a) No person shall manufacture, assemble, or offer for sale, resale, lease, or
distribution in commerce (1) any digital audio recording device which does not
contain a copy-code scanner; or (2) any device, product, or service, the primary
purpose or effect of which is to bypass, remove, or deactivate a copy-code scan-
ner: Provided, that any patent, technical know-how, or proprietary rights neces-
sary for manufacturing a copy-code scanner have been available by means of a
royalty-free license.
(b) No person shall bypass, remove, or deactivate a copy-code scanner.
Id. at 5-6. Section 2(2) of H.R. 1384 defines a copy-code scanner as follows:
A "copy-code scanner" is an electronic circuit or comparable system of circuitry
(A) which is built into the recording mechanism of an audio recording device;
(B) which, if removed, bypassed, or deactivated, would render inoperative the
recording capability of the audio recording device; (C) which continually detects,
within the audio frequency range of three thousand five hundred to four thou-
sand one hundred hertz, a notch in an encoded phonorecord; and (D) which,
upon detecting a notch, prevents the audio recording device from recording the
sounds embodied in the encoded phonorecord by causing the recording mecha-
nism of the device to stop recording for at least twenty-five seconds.
Id. at 4; see also Hearings on S. 506, supra note 9, at 8-13 (reviewing the same issues
as H.R. 1384).
13. See Note, Toward a Unified Theory of Copyright Infringement for an Ad-
vanced Technological Era, 96 HARV. L. REV. 450, 450-53 (1982) [hereinafter Note,
Toward a Unified Theory] (emphasizing that new methods for reproducing and distrib-
uting copyrighted works are often introduced into the United States). Innovative scien-
tific devices for reproducing and transmitting written and graphic materials facilitate
accessibility to copyrightable works. Id. at 451. These developments foster the unregu-
lated distribution of copyrighted works because copying is now easy, inexpensive, and
anonymous. Id. The innovations consequently erode the ability of copyright to balance
the public need to access intellectual works against the creators' need for financial re-
ward. Id. at 453-54; see also OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, U.S. CONGRESS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AN AGE OF ELECTRONICS AND INFORMATION 97-
123 (1986) [hereinafter IPR] (stating that recent technology, which makes the copy,
transfer, and manipulation of information and intellectual property cheaper, faster, and
more private, undermines the ability to control the distribution of copyrighted works).
Owners of copyrights, therefore, may realize less return for their creative efforts and
financial investments. Id. at 97. Furthermore, owners encounter difficulty detecting,
proving, and stopping infringements. Id. Their incentive to create new works conse-
quently may decrease. Id.
14. See IPR, supra note 13, at 19 (stating that the evolution of intellectual prop-
erty rights embodied a balance of social, political, and economic interests). Traditional
enforcement mechanisms are proving inadequate. Id. at 98. As technologies change,
the copyright system and its boundaries become ambiguous. Id.; see also Note, Toward
a Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 451 (discussing the rigid nature of the traditional
copyright system). Despite its technologically nurtured evolution, the copyright system
fails to acknowledge new groups of creators. Id. This inherent inability to expand cre-
ates a strain in the ability of the copyright law to respond to new technologies, Id.
See generally 5 N. HENRY, COPYRIGHT, CONGRESS AND TECHNOLOGY: THE PUBLIC
RECORD iv-xii (1980) (discussing the effect of technology on prior revisions of the
[VOL. 4:409
DAT TECHNOLOGY & COPYRIGHT
vances in technology are reconcilable with the reasonable needs of the
artistic and literary efforts of the creative community.25
The ideological foundation of the American copyright system at-
tempts to balance social, political, economic, and technological inter-
ests. 6 The framework of the system, which is incorporated in article 1,
section 8 of the United States Constitution, gives Congress authority to
enact copyright laws that protect the works of an author. 17 The purpose
of copyright protection is first to encourage the creation and distribu-
tion of information and knowledge to the public, and second to promote
science and the useful arts. 8 To achieve this goal, Congress periodi-
cally modifies copyright law in response to a variety of technological
advancements.19
Although originally designed to resolve problems associated only
with printed publications,20 the United States constitutional framework
American copyright system). The current stress on the American copyright system
raises the question of whether to expand existing copyright protection to works not
currently covered under American law. IPR, supra note 13, at 19-20.
15. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (noting the attempt, in the American
copyright system, to balance the needs of a creator with the need to promote technolog-
ical development).
16. IPR, supra note 13, at 19; see Ringer, United States of America, in INTERNA-
TIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING RIGHTS 480-532 (1983) (discussing the foun-
dation of the American copyright system).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cI. 1, cl. 8. Article I states that "The Congress shall
have Power. .. To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings
and Discoveries. . . ." Id. cl. 1, cl. 8.
18. IPR, supra note 13, at 19; see Patterson, Book Review, 34 VAND. L. REV. 833,
835 (1981) (stating that courts view copyright as a necessary form of monopoly). To
accomplish this goal, Congress granted authors certain monopoly rights in their works.
Id. at 841. Congress developed the rights to stimulate creativity. Id. at 834. The sys-
tem, however, fosters an environment which allows publishers to take advantage of
authors. Id. at 842. Authors, who typically possess meager bargaining power, assign
their rights to publishers. Id. Consequently, authors are not benefiting from the protec-
tion accorded under the present system. Id. at 843; see also Ringer, supra note 16, at
480-83 (noting the development of American copyright law).
The monopoly rights of authors encounter complicated statutory limitations under
American law. A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBURG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHT-
IEs 33 (1985) [hereinafter COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES]. The American copyright
act utilizes a system of compulsory licensing. Id. Under the system, certain reproduc-
tions, performances, and displays are exempt from liability and do not require a copy-
right owner's consent. Id. Instead, the user must comply with statutory formalities and
pay specified fees to the copyright owner. Id. The licensing system covers the record-
ings of nondramatic musical works, jukebox performances, certain cable transmissions,
and certain public broadcasting uses. Id.
19. See Note, Toward a Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 450-51 (noting that in
response to new forms of technology, judicial interpretation and statutory revision ex-
panded copyright protection). A direct correlation exists between the growth of copy-
right and advancements in technology. Id.
20. IPR, supra note 13, at 19; see B. KAPLAN, AN UNHURRIED VIEW OF COPY-
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proved flexible enough to accommodate a variety of new technologies. 1
Technological advances in personal computers,22 videotape recorders,23
and audio tape recorders,2' however, test the limits of this flexibility.26
Moreover, these advances foster a gradual deterioration in the relation-
ship between the goals of copyright law in promoting social change,
and the influence of the copyright system in an information age.26
As the new technologies of the fifteenth century shaped the present
American copyright system, 27 DAT promises to alter significantly how
Congress views the copyright law, the mechanisms employed to protect
copyrighted works, and the value society places on copyright protec-
tion.28 Because the traditional copyright system cannot effectively ac-
RIGHT 1-37 (1966) (explaining that the establishment of a scheme of royal rights
granted to publishers originated with the printing press). The rights granted to publish-
ers were the ownership of the copy of the book and the exclusive right to publish the
book. Id. at 4.
21. IPR, supra note 13, at 19; see Note, Toward a Unified Theory, supra note 13,
at 450-53 (noting the gradual growth of copyright to accommodate new media of ex-
pression). See generally Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239
(1903) (holding that chromolithographic illustrations in advertisements are entitled to
copyright protection); Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884)
(discussing the protection of photographic works); Copyrights, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90
Stat. 2565 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982)) (expanding copyright protec-
tion to computer programs); Act of Oct. 15, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391
(current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1982)) (expanding copyright protection to
sound recordings); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 86, 16 Stat. 198, 212 (current ver-
sion at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1982)) (expanding copyright protection to chromoli-
thography); Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 2, 13 Stat. 540 (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 102 (a)(5) (1982)) (expanding copyright protection to photography).
22. IPR, supra note 13, at 102-03. The ability of the computers to handle large
amounts of data creates difficulty for copyright owners to enforce their rights. Id. at
102. Computers pose three major problems: (1) computers copy digital information at
a fraction of the cost and in a fraction of the time it takes with photocopying or analog
audio or videotaping; (2) computers can produce an infinite number of perfect copies of
material; and (3) computers can make many copies of parts of works. Id.
23. Id. at 100-01. The increased use of audio and videotape recorders brought
about more unauthorized copying of copyrighted materials. Id. at 100. New machines
that reproduce works in private, at low cost, and with little effort effectively disable
copyright owners to control the copying of their work. Id.
See Leete, Betamax and Sound Recordings: Is Copyright in Trouble?, 23 AM. Bus.
L.J. 551, 558-72 (1986) (discussing that the last confrontation between publishers and
a new technology concerned the videotape recorder). Movie production companies un-
successfully argued that home videotaping of television programs constituted copyright
infringement. Id. at 559.
24. Leete, supra note 23, at 551-58.
25. See Note, Toward a Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 450-53 (noting the ef-
fect of technology on the American copyright system).
26. See IPR, supra note 13, at 31 (discussing the goals of intellectual property in a
changing information environment).
27. See supra note 20 and accompanying text (describing how the printing press
fostered the creation of the copyright system).
28. IPR, supra note 13, at 20. Governments grant intellectual property rights to
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commodate this new technology, lawmakers must modify the current
protection.29 In this way, American copyright jurisprudence will adopt
the needed flexibility to accommodate the impact of advances in a tech-
nological era.
This Comment examines the doctrinal tensions in American copy-
right law in light of rapid advances in recording technology. The Com-
ment also discusses the inherent inability of the United States Congress
to expand copyright protection in response to new technologies like
DAT, and compares the United States system to the protection ac-
corded under the Japanese system. Part I addresses the influence of
technology on American copyright law. Part II examines the Japanese
copyright system and its ability to deal successfully with technological
innovations in recording.30 Finally, the Comment concludes that the
United States Congress should adopt legislation that provides broader
copyright protection through the recognition of both a proprietary right
and a personal right in a creation.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF TECHNOLOGY ON AMERICAN
COPYRIGHT LAW
All intellectual property systems seek to establish policies that effect
the use and flow of information in society. 31 These policies attempt to
achieve a suitable balance between the needs of creators, producers,
and distributors of creative works and the needs of the public.3 2 Consis-
tent with this objective, Congress originally formulated the American
copyright system to deal with the new social and economic changes
generated from the invention of the printing press.3
The effect of the invention of the printing press in fifteenth century
achieve a variety of policy goals. Id. at 19. The policy goals adopted depend on history,
circumstances, and the needs of society. Id.
29. See id. at 103 (explaining that recent technologies are making the American
copyright system ambiguous and obsolete). Because of technical advances, traditional
copyright enforcement mechanisms no longer effectively protect the creative and eco-
nomic interests of copyright owners. Id.
30. See infra notes 189-224 and accompanying text (explaining the characteristics
of Japanese copyright law). The Japanese copyright system grants a wider range of
rights to individuals as opposed to many other systems around the world and also incor-
porates many of the provisions developed in international copyright conventions. Id.
31. IPR, supra note 13, at 32.
32. Id. at 31-32.
33. Id. at 32; see S. STEWART, INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBOURING
RIGHTs 7-9 (1983) (stating that booksellers needed protection from unauthorized re-
production). Early copyright advocates sought to prohibit unrestricted copying, which
could lead to unjust enrichment. Id. at 8. In addition, the drafters of copyright law
believed that unregulated copying would deprive creators of incentive and undermine
competitive creativity. Id.
1989] 415
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Europe on copyright law reveals the reciprocal correlation between the
maturing of copyright law and the development of technology.84 This
technological revolution in communications led to the development of
an Anglo-Saxon system of copyright privileges to accommodate the
newly-established publishing trade.3 5 The Anglo-Saxon copyright sys-
tem primarily concerned itself with the protection of the right of repro-
duction.38 The privileges provided protection of printed material against
unauthorized reproduction to insure economic benefits for investing in
the works of authors.3 7 The dominance of printing technology caused
the scope of this protection to remain basically unchanged until the
second half of the nineteenth century.38
The Anglo-Saxon idea of copyright later became the foundation of
the copyright system in the United States. 39 The American copyright
system thus is based on the Anglo-Saxon ideological rationale that
copyright is an exclusive proprietary right, as distinct from a personal
right, granted to the author to protect the author's economic interest in
a work against any unauthorized reproduction.'0 The recognition of the
34. See Ringer, supra note 16, at 480-81 (stating that copyright laws governing a
society must expand to accommodate new technology).
35. S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 11. A royal decree in 1556 established the Sta-
tioners' Company in England. COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES, supra note 18, at I.
Under this decree, the members (stationers) had to register all published works with
the Stationers' Company. Id. Registration established the stationers' sole right to print
and publish the works for themselves, their heirs, and their assigns forever. Id.
36. See S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 7-8 (stating that copyright originated as a
right to prevent reproduction).
37. Id.; see Patterson, supra note 18, at 840 (explaining that the stationers were
primarily concerned with the establishment of a monopoly of printing and publishing).
38. See IPR, supra note 13, at 99 (noting the difficulty of concealing infringements
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries because the amount of capital and labor
required for reproduction remained high). The technologies of the mid-twentieth cen-
tury, however, made it much cheaper and easier to copy materials. Id. As a result,
enforcement became more difficult to achieve because more people began to copy. Id.
39. S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 24 (stating that the traditional Anglo-Saxon
idea of granting publishers with a monopoly control in printing and publishing was
transplanted to the United States).
40. Id. at 7-8; see infra notes 174-187 and accompanying text (explaining the dif-
ferences between the Anglo-Saxon and European copyright systems). See DaSilva,
Droit Moral and the Amoral Copyright: A Comparison of Artists' Rights in France
and the United States, 28 BULL., COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S. AM. 1, 3 (1980) (defining the
author's proprietary and moral/personal right in a work). The author's proprietary
right is essentially a pecuniary and exploitative interest in a work. Id. These economic
interests are protected through the recognition of an author's exclusive right to control
the reproduction and public performance of a work. Francon & Ginsburg, Author's
Rights in France: The Moral Right of the Creator of a Commissioning Work to Com-
pel the Commissioning Party to Complete the Work, 9 COLUM. J. ART & L. 381, 381
(1985).
The concept of moral right originated in France. DaSilva, supra, at 5. The right is a
nonpecuniary interest that protects the integrity of works and the personality of the
[VOL. 4:409
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need to protect authors' control of their original written expressions led
directly to the inclusion of article 1, section 8, clause 8 in the United
States Constitution. This section delegates to Congress the power to
grant authors a limited monopoly in their works.41
A. DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT IN THE UNITED STATES
The scope of the American copyright system has expanded over time
from encompassing solely printed works, under the Copyright Act of
1790 (1790 Act),42 to including, under the Copyright Act of 1976
(1976 Act),43 all original works fixed in a tangible medium of expres-
sion. The first change in the American copyright law did not occur
until the granting of copyright protection to photographs and negatives
in 1865. 4 Since then, Congress has remained reluctant to accommo-
date copyright to new technology,4 5 and the growth process of the
American copyright system has proceeded at a surprisingly slow rate.40
author. Id. at 3. Under French law, moral right is divided into four distinct rights. Id.
These rights are: the right to publish a work; the right to modify or withdraw a pub-
lished work; the right to associate the author's name to a work; and the right to protect
a work from alteration or mutilation. Id. at 3-4. In addition, the French copyright
system declares that the concept of moral right is personal, perpetual, inalienable, and
unassignable. Id. at 4. Finally, French law allows the moral right to survive the au-
thor's pecuniary rights and the author's life. Id. at 5.
American law does not explicitly acknowledge the concept of moral right. Id. at 39.
The American Copyright Act of 1976, however, provides some protection for the au-
thor's personal rights through the recognition of an author's exclusive right to make
derivative works. Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1982). Consequently, an American
author has the same right granted under the French concept of moral right to control
the alteration of a work. Id.
41. S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 25; see U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, cl. 8
(describing the power of Congress to grant exclusive rights to authors and inventors to
protect their respective works and discoveries).
42. See Copyright Act of 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124 (current version at 17
U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1982)) (stating that the authors of maps, charts, and books have
the sole right of publication).
43. Patterson, supra note 18, at 835-39; Copyrights, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (1976) (as amended by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)); see 17
U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982) (listing copyrightable works of authorship).
44. Patterson, supra note 18, at 835-39; see Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 126, § 1, 13
Stat. 540, 540 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102(1)(5) (1982)) (expanding protection
to photographs and negatives).
45. See Patterson, supra note 18, at 835 (noting that the first Supreme Court case
on copyright, Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834), exhibited this
skepticism).
46. Id.
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1. Gradual Expansion of Protection
In the Copyright Act of 1909 (1909 Act),' 7 Congress expanded the
subject matter of copyright protection."8 For the first time, Congress
granted protection to "all the writings of an author."'" The expansion
was necessary to protect the publishers' economic interests in newly de-
veloped media of expression.5" Despite the expansion of the subject
matter of protected works, there was no sense of a need to revise the
rights accorded to the author.51
The acknowledgement that all the writings of the author require pro-
tection changed the concept of copyright.52 The function of copyright
was no longer viewed primarily as a concept of trade regulation.3 In-
stead, copyright became perceived as an exclusive proprietary con-
cept.5' The expansion, however, did not extend copyright protection to
profit derived from all creative works. 55 For example, the creative ef-
forts of record companies and performers, in the production of sound
recordings, are not adequately compensated under American law.56 The
fiction that copyright is exclusively an author's right prevented this and
other logical progressions in the development of the American copy-
47. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (current version at 17 U.S.C.
(1982)).
48. Id. § 4, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1982)).
49. See id. § 5, 35 Stat. 1075, 1076-77 (current version at 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(l)-
(7) (1982)) (noting the works accorded copyright protection).
50. Id.; see COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES, supra note 18, at 7-8 (explaining the
reasons for the 1909 revision of American copyright law). The revision was deemed
necessary in response to the developments in aural and visual recording. Id. at 8. These
developments were in the areas of the motion picture, radio, television, and phono-
graph. Id. Furthermore, changes in business methods and practices fostered the need to
improve the copyright system. Id.
51. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 1(a), 35 Stat. 1075, 1075 (current version
at 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982)) (noting that the 1909 Act included the exclusive rights of
printing, reprinting, publishing, copying, and vending).
52. See Patterson, supra note 18, 838-41 (explaining the origins of Anglo-Saxon
copyright law). Originally, copyright functioned as a trade regulation device. Id. at
839-41. The primary motivation was to develop an instrument of censorship and press
control. Id. at 840.
53. Id.
54. See id. at 838-39 (explaining that copyright no longer merely provided the au-
thor of a work with control of the work for profit, but also expanded to provide the
author with complete control over the work itself).
55. See id. at 839 (noting that the debate of the past continues and results in much
confusion concerning the scope of current copyright protection).
56. See infra notes 81-97 and accompanying text (describing the limited rights ac-
corded to the creators of sound recordings). Record companies and performers do not
receive royalties when a sound recording is played over a radio or in a jukebox. Id.
Only the owner of copyright in the musical composition receives royalties for the public
performance of a sound recording. Id.
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erty.86 Consequently, the notion that copyright exists to protect the au-
thor's personal right wrongfully served as a rationalization for enlarg-
ing the proprietary rights of the copyright owner." This rationalization
proved more beneficial to the monopolist than the author. 8
The United States Congress relied on the Statute of Anne as a model
for its copyright law. The American copyright system is thus based on
the fiction that copyright is exclusively an author's right.79 This fiction
results in much confusion as to the scope of the present copyright sys-
tem. 0 Moreover, it produces a copyright system that is very rigid and
unable to grant adequate compensation for the exploitation of a
broader array of works.
3. Inability to Expand Compensation: The United States and Neigh-
boring Rights
Most nations recognize the concept of neighboring rights.8 ' Neigh-
boring rights provide the performers with the right to receive royalties
76. Id. at 844; see Abrams, The Historic Foundation of American Copyright Law.
Exploding the Myth of Common Law Copyright, 29 WAYNE L. REv. 1119, 1120-87
(1983) (examining the historical foundation of American copyright law). The dominant
concern of copyright jurisprudence is the public interest in creation and accessibility of
intellectual works. Id. at 1187. This concern is paramount to the interests of authors.
Id.; see Woodmansee, supra note 11, at 425-48 (examining the emergence of the con-
cept of author). The author is viewed as the individual responsible and hence deserving
credit for creating a unique work. Id. at 426. This definition of author is a modem
phenomenon. Id. In the Renaissance, the author represented a craftsman who utilized
works of the past in order to produce works for the present. Id. Accordingly, writings
were considered in the public domain and authors were granted no rights in their
works. Id. at 434. Occasionally, the author was deemed an inspired craftsman when he
or she produced a truly unique work. Id. at 427. In the eighteenth century, the author
became regarded solely as an individual who created a new or original work. Id. at 445.
The works of an author thus became the exclusive property of the author. Id. The
formulation of the concept of copyright, in the eighteenth century, however, was not in
"recognition of the rights of authors, but the protection of printers." Id. at 437. Print-
ers required legal protection from the increase in the unauthorized reprinting of books.
Id.
77. Patterson, supra note 18, at 845.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 839-43.
80. See id. at 844 (noting that revisions of the copyright law are necessary because
new technology has outstripped copyright as an author's right).
81. See infra notes 199-205 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of
neighboring rights). See generally 2 COPYRIGHT LAWs AND TREAIES OF THE WORLD
(UNESCO & WIPO Supp. 1984-86) [hereinafter 2 COPYRIGHT LAWS] (reprinting the
laws of several countries that provide neighboring rights); Comment, International
Copyright: Domestic Barriers to United States Participation in the Rome Convention
on Neighboring Rights, 13 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 83, 83-85 (1983) [hereinafter
Comment, Domestic Barriers] (discussing the impact of the nonrecognition of neigh-
boring rights in the United States).
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from radio and television broadcasts of their sound recordings. 2 Such
rights are not recognized in the United States.8 3 American law gives
royalty rights only to the owner of the copyrights.8 4 Non-owning per-
formers are thus precluded from sharing in broadcast revenues. 8
The failure of the United States Congress to adopt neighboring
rights prevents its participation in the International Convention for the
Protection of Performers, Production of Phonograms and Broadcasting
Organizations (Rome Convention).88 The absence of the United States
82. Comment, Domestic Barriers, supra note 81, at 83-84.
83. See Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 114 (1982) (noting the scope of exclusive rights in
sound recordings); D'Onofrio, In Support of Performance Rights in Sound Recordings,
29 UCLA L. REV. 168, 168-69 (1981) (explaining that the reason behind the inability
of the United States to expand protection to works not inherently original is primarily
historical, but is also in part a result of strong opposition from the broadcasting indus-
try). Performers and record companies face serious financial difficulties as a result of
home taping. Id. at 182-83. Record companies and performers must receive broadcast
royalties to curtail the decline in record sales. Id.; see Diamond, Sound Recordings and
Phonorecords: History and Current Law, 13 INTELL. L. REV. 415, 432-37 (1979) (stat-
ing that only unauthorized duplication, as distinguished from imitation, can infringe a
sound recording copyright); Greenberg, The Plight Of The American Musician: A
Study Of Comparative Copyright Law And Proposed Performers' Protection Act, 6
Loy. ENT. L.J. 31, 32-36 (1986) (noting that the 1976 Copyright Act specifically lim-
its the scope of exclusive rights given to sound recordings and non-dramatic musical
works); see also Urwin, Paying the Piper: Performance Rights in Musical Recordings,
COMMUNICATIONS AND THE LAW, Winter 1983, at 3, 4-5, 55-57 (noting the lack of
protection for sound recordings and recommending that a bill creating a performance
right only in creative performances would have an easier time becoming law); Note,
Copyright: Performance Rights for Sound Recordings Under the General Copyright
Revision Act-The Continuing Debate, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 402, 402-11 (1978) (stating
that record manufacturers support the expansion of the 1976 Act to include perform-
ance rights for sound recordings). The broadcasting industry leads the opposition to
such an expansion. Id. at 403. Broadcasters contend that the additional expense of
royalty payments to record manufacturers is too great a burden. Id. at 404. Manufac-
turers contend that the broadcasters can pay and that the present system is unjust. Id.;
Comment, Sound Recording Copyright Law-Its Application To The Performance Of
Records And Tapes, 11 CUMB. L. REV. 447, 450-52 (1980) (noting that the record
manufacturer is not provided with the same broad protection as that provided for the
author of a copyrighted song).
84. See Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 115(c)(1) (1982) (noting that the copyright owner
is to receive royalties for records made and distributed).
85. Comment, Domestic Barriers, supra note 81, at 83.
86. International Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phono-
grams and Broadcasting Organizations, Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43, reprinted in 3
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (UNESCO & WIPO Supp. 1978).
The performer is given minimum rights of performance. Id. art. 7(1). The performer is
protected against unauthorized broadcasts of his or her performances. Id. art. 7(l)(a).
In addition, the performer is protected from unauthorized fixation of his or her per-
formances, thereby preventing the taping of his or her works from a live performance
and subsequent sale without permission. Id. art. 7(1)(c); see Comment, Domestic Bar-
riers, supra note 81, at 83-84 (stating that because the United States does not recog-
nize the concept of neighboring rights, it is precluded from participating in the Rome
Convention).
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right system.51
2. Exclusively an Author's Right
In Great Britain, prior to Parliament's granting any rights to au-
thors, the Stationers' Company, a London company of the book trade,
had a monopoly on the printing and publishing of books. 8 Only mem-
bers of the Stationers' Company (stationers) could acquire the exclu-
sive right to publish a work. 9 Once granted, the right to publish ex-
isted in perpetuity."0
Eventually, Parliament refused to continue the stationers' monop-
oly. 1 In an effort to maintain their monopoly, the stationers supported
the enactment of a copyright statute to protect authors rather than
themselves. 2 This resulted in the English Copyright Act of 1710, the
Statute of Anne.6 3 As a result of the statute, an author had the ability,
for the first time, to secure a statutory copyright."
With the advent of the Statute of Anne, the stationers lost the
perpetuity of the exclusive right to publish a work. In an attempt to
regain the right indirectly, the stationers argued that the author pos-
sessed, in addition to a statutory copyright, a common law copyright in
57. See Patterson, supra note 18, at 839 (stating that the fiction that copyright is
exclusively an author's right compounds the problems of balancing the interests of the
copyright owner with those of the users of the copyrighted work). The fiction, however,
defies the history of copyright. COPYRIGHT FOR THE ExIrTriES, supra note 18, at 1-8.
As history demonstrates, publishers originally developed copyright for their benefit, and
the author did not become encompassed within its scope until a later date. Id.
58. See COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES, supra note 18, at 1-8 (stating that the
Anglo-Saxon copyright system originated as a product of the monopoly granted to the
Stationers' Company on printing and publishing).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 1 (noting Parliament eventually objected to the growing strength of
the monopoly of the booksellers).
62. See id. at 3 (explaining that the stationers argued the necessity of a copyright
law in order to protect authors' rights). The stationers used this argument, however, to
in fact regain more protection for themselves. Id.
63. Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19, reprinted in COPYRIGHT FOR THE
EIGHIES, supra note 18, at 2-3; see B. Ringer, Bowker Memorial Lecture (Oct. 24,
1974) reprinted in The Demonology of Copyright, PUBLISHER'S WEExK, Nov. 18, 1974,
at 26-27 (describing the Statute of Anne). Ringer states that the enactment of the
Statute of Anne designated the end of autocracy in English copyright and established
two democratic principles. Id. The first principle was the recognition of the author as
the ultimate beneficiary and fountainhead of protection. Id. The second principle was
an assurance of legal protection against unauthorized use for limited time. Id. This
assurance came without any elements of prior restraint of censorship by the govern-
ment or its agents. Id.
64. See Statute of Anne, 1710, 8 Anne, ch. 19, reprinted in COPYRIGHT FOR THE
EIGHTIES, supra note 18, at 2-3 (granting the right to secure copyright to the author
and his or her assignee or assigns).
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perpetuity upon creation.65 The purpose was to regain the stationers'
copyright in the guise of a common law copyright.66
In 1768, the court of the King's Bench ruled in Millar v. Taylor 7
that an author had a common law copyright existing in perpetuity. 8
The court, in addition, held that such a right was assignable to the
booksellers.6 9 In Donaldson v. Beckett,7" however, the House of Lords
overruled the Millar holding. The Lords ruled that an author does pos-
sess a common law copyright, but that the right only exists until
publication. 1
In Millar, the court essentially recognized the personal rights of an
author.7 2 The court drew a distinction between an author's common
law copyright and statutory copyright.7 3 The Donaldson holding, which
limited an author's common law copyright to prepublication, prompted
the subordination of an author's personal right and the accentuation of
an author's proprietary right.74
The failure to provide equal recognition of both the personal and the
proprietary rights of an author generated confusion.70 The confusion
led to the recognition that an author possesses a special kind of interest
in a work that is beyond the economic interest associated with prop-
65. Patterson, supra note 18, at 842-43.
66. Id. at 842.
67. Millar v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769).
68. Id. at 258-62.
69. Id.
70. Donaldson v. Beckett, 2 Bro. P.C. 129, 1 Eng. Rep. 837 (H.L. 1774).
71. Id. 846-49.
72. See Patterson, supra note 18, at 842-44 (explaining that the court of the King's
Bench recognized an author's common law copyright as existing separately from his or
her statutory copyright). In addition, the House of Lords held that the recognition of
an author's common law copyright exists in perpetuity, and thereby exhibited a belief
that an author possesses a personal right in his or her work. Id. at 844; see also L.
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 64-77 (1968) (noting that evi-
dence exists to indicate that the stationers recognized the creative rights of an author).
While the stationer's copyright generally was a publisher's right, the statutory copy-
right became an author's right. Id. This right came to embrace all the rights of an
author in connection with his or her published work. Id.; see S. STEWART, supra note
33, at 6-7 (explaining the concept of personal rights). Personal rights are based on the
idea that the work of an author represents the personality of the author. Id. at 6.
Consequently, the author has a natural right to control the use of the work. Id.; see
also infra notes 174-187 and accompanying text (noting the recognition of personal
rights under the European and Japanese copyright systems).
73. Patterson, supra note 18, at 842-45.
74. See id. at 842-44 (stating that the stationer's copyright for publishers became
recognized as an author's copyright).
75. See id. at 842-45 (emphasizing that the inconsistent decisions of the House of
Lords explain the confused state of copyright). As a consequence, copyright fails to
provide equal protection of both proprietary and personal rights. Id.
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from the Convention deprives American artists of potential income
from both domestic and international airplay.8 7 Under the present
scheme, a majority of performers receive nothing from the broadcasts
of their performances to the public.88
a. Neighboring Rights and Sound Recordings
The 1976 Act extends copyright protection to sound recordings.89
The Act grants the owner of a sound recording, usually a record com-
pany, the exclusive right to copy the sound recording, to prepare deriv-
ative works through, for example, remixing and rearranging techniques,
and to distribute copies to the public."' The Act denies the exclusive
right to public performance, but grants the right to public performance
to other subjects of copyright protection." Therefore, under the current
system, the songwriter or composer who is also the copyright owner of
the work receives compensation for public performances, while record
companies and performers who are not copyright owners are paid noth-
ing for their creative efforts. 2
Under the present American system, the record companies derive in-
come only from sales, and performers usually do not receive royalties
from the sales of their recorded performances. 3 The only groups pres-
ently benefiting from the copyright system are composers and broad-
casters.94 The composers receive broadcast royalties through contracts
and the broadcasters profit from advertising revenues? 5
In an age of advances in recording technology, the present copyright
87. Comment, Domestic Barriers, supra note 81, at 84; see Performance Rights
Amendment of 1977: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and
the Administration of Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 180 (1978) (noting that American performers could have received over S13 mil-
lion in annual foreign income in 1976 in addition to an equal amount in revenue from
American airplay).
88. Comment, Domestic Barriers, supra note 81, at 84.
89. Copyrights, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2544 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
102(a)(7) (1982)).
90. See Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 106(l)-(3) (1976) (noting the exclusive rights
granted to copyright owners).
91. Id. § 114(a); see id. § 106(4) (listing works protected under the right to public
performance).
92. See Comment, Domestic Barriers, supra note 81, at 98 (explaining that the law
does not deem creations produced by record companies and performers original works
and therefore does not give them exclusive copyright protection).
93. Id. at 98-100.
94. See id. at 100 (stating that composers receive royalties for airplay while broad-
casters exploit the efforts of performers and record companies because broadcasters are
not required to pay royalties).
95. Id.
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law denies record companies and performers their rights to royalties for
performances of their records and tapes. 6 To correct this injustice, the
American copyright system should accommodate the proprietary rights
of both the manufacturer and the performer in public performances
through the adoption of neighboring rights.97 The absence of the broad
range of protection accorded under neighboring rights results in the
nonrecognition of performance rights in sound recordings for perform-
ers and record companies. Consequently, the American copyright sys-
tem fails to provide adequate compensation to record companies and
performers in response to the constant innovations and technological
advancements in sound recordings.
4. Inability to Cope with Recording Technology
An increasingly popular technology is tape recording. Tape recording
technology was introduced to the public almost thirty years ago.9 8 Be-
cause the equipment was expensive, bulky, and difficult to operate, the
record industry was not concerned about its possible impact on their
profits." With the advent of the tape cassette, however, the potential
for copying sound recordings increased dramatically.100 The recording
format, for the first time, enabled the user to conveniently and inexpen-
sively reproduce sound recordings in an individual's home.10 1
96. See id. at 98-100 (noting that the realization that airplay does not make prof-
its has led performers to increase their demands when negotiating a recording con-
tract). Contractors pass these increases on to the consumer, which in turn causes in-
creases in record prices. Id.
97. See id. at 98-108 (explaining that performers and record companies should
receive some economic rights for their efforts). The present system is a commercial
exploitation of both record companies and performers. D'Onofrio, supra note 83, at
168-70. Congress attempted to resolve the problem by proposing to introduce perform-
ance rights in sound recordings into American copyright law. Id. at 190. Since the
1950s, Congress has unsuccessfully attempted numerous proposals and revisions of
draft bills to grant performance rights in sound recordings. Id. H.R. 1805 is the most
recent attempt to grant performance rights in sound recordings.' H.R. 1805, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1981). Congressional attempts, however, have proved unsuccessful
due to strong opposition from the broadcasting industry. D'Onofrio, supra note 83, at
173. The opponents rely on the copyright clause and on the first amendment to argue
the unconstitutionality of a sound recording performance right. Id.
98. See Comment, Home Audio Recording After Betamax: Taking a Fresh Look,
36 BAYLOR L. REV. 855, 855-56 (1984) [hereinafter Comment, Home Audio Record-
ing] (discussing the introduction of sound recording technology).
99. Id. at 856. The amount of home recording was small because of the state of
recording technology. Id.
100. Id. Tape cassette recorders are small, convenient, and inexpensive. Id. The
recorders can record directly from turntables, receivers, and other tape decks. Id.
101. Id.
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The practice of home recording has become commonplace. 102 This
significant increase is adversely effecting copyright owners. 03 The
value of individual copyrights are declining because home sound re-
cording technology enables the user to reproduce and distribute copy-
righted works with ease.Y' Accordingly, traditional enforcement mech-
anisms are inadequate because violators are no longer easily
identifiable."0 5 The result is an unworkable scheme of copyright
enforcement. 0 6
B. COPYRIGHT AND SOuND RECORDINGS
The legal status of home sound recording is still uncertain. 07 The
debate on this issue concerns whether home duplication of sound re-
cordings for personal use constitutes copyright infringement. 03 In par-
ticular, the issue centers on whether the 1971 Sound Recording
Amendment (1971 Amendment) 0 9 intended to exempt home sound re-
cording from the then-extant 1909 Act, and, if so, whether Congress
incorporated this intent into the 1976 Act."0
102. See id. (estimating that about 60% of American households own at least one
tape recorder).
103. See Leete, supra note 23, at 551-54 (explaining that there is evidence that
recording technology is threatening the record industry and artists).
104. Note, Toward a Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 454. Recording technology
makes copyrighted materials increasingly available to the public. Id. The record indus-
try claims that this phenomenon results in an annual loss of about SI billion in industry
profits. Leete, supra note 23, at 552.
105. Note, Toward a Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 454; see Teruo Doi, Copy-
right Problems of the Videogram, PAT. & LICENSING, Aug. 1985, at 15, 16 (noting
that copyright owners have difficulty holding individuals who record at home liable for
copyright infringement).
106. Note, Toward a Unified Theory, supra note 13, at 454. In response to con-
gressional inaction in revising the copyright system, the courts must apply outdated
copyright doctrines to current allegations of copyright infringement. Id.; see IPR,
supra note 13, at 97-123 (discussing the detrimental effects of recording technology on
the American copyright system).
107. See Leete, supra note 23, at 551-54 (noting that a debate exists over whether
copyright owners require more protection than the copyright law now provides because
of the advent of new tape recording technology); Comment, Home Audio Recording,
supra note 98, at 855-59 (arguing that home duplication of copyrighted audio record-
ings constitutes copyright infringement); Cole, Home Videotaping of Copyright Mate-
rial: Cracks in the 1976 Copyright Act?, 11 CAP. U.L. REv. 215, 262-63 (1982) (stat-
ing that congressional legislation is needed to clarify the legal situation concerning both
home videotaping and audio taping); Nimmer, Copyright Liability for Audio Home
Recording. Dispelling the Betamax Myth, 68 VA. L. REv. 1505, 1505-06 (1982) [here-
inafter Nimmer, Betamax Myth] (arguing that no exemption from copyright liability
exists for home audio recording).
108. Supra note 107 and accompanying text.
109. 1971 Sound Recording Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, 85 Stat. 391 (1971)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 US.C.).
110. See Comment, Home Audio Recording, supra note 98, at 859 (discussing
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Originally, the 1909 Act provided no copyright protection to sound
recordings.11' The 1909 Act, however, granted copyright protection to
the composer of a musical work."' The dramatic increase in the unau-
thorized reproduction and commercial distribution of records and tapes
in the late 1960s necessitated the expansion of the scope of copyright
protection.11 3 Congress amended the 1909 Act with the 1971 Amend-
ment. 1 4 This amendment provided copyright protection to sound re-
cordings for the first time.1" 5
The inability of the 1909 Act to cope with rapid developments in
technology caused Congress to revise the Act in 1976.116 The 1976 Act
specifies the exclusive rights of the copyright owner," 7 lists exemptions
whether home audio recording is exempt from the 1976 Act).
111. See id. at 858 (noting that the framers of American copyright law did not
believe that an artist's particular interpretation of a musical composition was also a
unique work of authorship entitled to copyright protection). Therefore, the 1909 Act
gave no protection to sound recordings. Id.
The inability of the American copyright system to extend protection to the products
of new technology is directly related to the fact that the concept of copyright developed
as the product of a particular kind of technology, the printing press. Patterson, supra
note 18, at 836. This early concept of copyright fostered the belief that copyright pro-
tection extended only to printed matter. Id. Sound recordings are not a form of printed
work and therefore did not receive protection. Id.
112. Nimmer, Betamax Myth, supra note 107, at 1508.
113. Comment, Home Audio Recording, supra note 98, at 858.
114. Nimmer, Betamax Myth, supra note 107, at 1508.
115. See supra notes 89-97 and accompanying text (describing the scope of protec-
tion accorded to sound recordings). See Nimmer, Betamax Myth, supra note 107, at
1508 n.13 (noting that copyright in a sound recording is different from copyright in the
musical or other underlying work that is the subject of the sound recording). Nimmer
states that the composer of the music, whose rights may be acquired by a music pub-
lisher, owns the copyright in the underlying musical work. Id. Both the 1909 Act and
prior copyright laws recognized this copyright. Id. The Sound Recording Amendment
of 1971, however, provided a copyright for those responsible for the artistic rendition of
the musical work as fixed in the form of a "phonorecord," which means a phonograph
record or tape. Id.
116. Patterson, supra note 18, at 835; Copyrights, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat.
2541 (1976) (codified at scattered sections of 17 U.S.C. (1982)).
117. Copyrights, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2546 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
106 (1982)). The rights of the copyright owner are as follows:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords;
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public for
sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the
copyrighted work publicly; and
(5) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomimes, and pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual
images of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted
work publicly.
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for certain uses of an author's work," 8 and codifies the judicially-devel-
oped fair use doctrine.""9 Furthermore, although the 1976 Act provides
protection for sound recordings, it does not exempt home sound record-
ing of copyrighted works from liability for infringement.1 20 Thus, liabil-
ity concerning home recording is avoidable only under the doctrine of
fair use.121
C. THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE
The fair use doctrine permits the reasonable use of copyrighted ma-
terial under certain circumstances without the consent of the copyright
owner.122 This judicially-developed doctrine is codified in the United
States Code, section 107 of the 1976 Act.123 Although the 1976 Act
fails to specifically define fair use, it identifies four specific factors that
are considered in determining what constitutes a reasonable reproduc-
tion of copyrighted works. 24 These four factors include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the
portion used in relation to the copy-
righted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted
work."'
Courts do not strictly impose these factors as rules of law; instead
they are used as elements when determining the merits of the affirma-
tive defense. 2 The relative importance of the factors involved in the
118. Copyrights, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2546-2560 (1976) (codified at 17
U.S.C. §§ 107-12 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986)).
119. Copyrights, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2546 (1976) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
107(1)-(4) (1982)); see infra notes 122-29 and accompanying text (discussing the fair
use doctrine).
120. Comment, Home Audio Recording, supra note 98, at 861.
121. Id.
122. Clark, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corporation of America: Applica-
tion of the Fair Use Doctrine Under the United States Copyright Acts of 1909 and
1976, 13 INTELL. L. REv. 451, 452 (1981). The four factors of the fair use doctrine
were incorporated from the test employed in Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States,
487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 420 Us.
376 (1975). Comment, Home Audio Recording, supra note 98, at 859 n.25.
123. Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1982).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Clark, supra note 122, at 461; see H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5659, 5689 (explaining the
application of the fair use doctrine).
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fair use analysis are not indicated in the language of section 107 or its
legislative history.2 Numerous cases and commentators, however, im-
ply that the most important factor is section 107(4), the economic ef-
fect of unrestricted use upon a protected work.128 In accordance with
this trend, the Supreme Court in Sony Corporation of America v. Uni-
versal City Studios, Inc. (Sony),' 29 emphasized the economic impact of
the private use of videotape recorders.
D. THE Sony CASE
In Sony, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether private home
use of videotape recorders to record copyrighted works from broadcast
television constituted a copyright infringement.13 0 Universal City Stu-
dios and Walt Disney Productions sued Sony shortly after Sony intro-
duced the videotape recorder into the American market.' 8 ' The plain-
tiffs alleged that the home recording of their copyrighted programs
constituted an infringement and that Sony was liable for contributory
infringement.'32 The plaintiffs also contended that the infringement
had the potential to cause them to suffer significant monetary
damages.1 33
Sony asserted that private home videotaping did not constitute an
infringement, and if it did, it did not fall under any theory of infringe-
127. Clark, supra note 122, at 461-62. The House report accompanying the bill to
enact the 1976 Copyright Revision Act stated the intention behind section 107. H.R.
REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEws 5659, 5680. The purpose of section 107 is to restate the judicial doctrine of
fair use, but not to change, narrow, or enlarge it in any way. Id.
128. See, e.g., 3 M. NiMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05 [A][4] (1979) (stat-
ing that the "harm factor" emerges as the most important factor in fair use cases);
Fried, Fair Use and the New Act, 22 N.Y.L. Scn. L. REV. 497, 502 (1976) (noting
that the fourth factor is the central fair use factor); see also Meeropol v. Nizer, 560
F.2d 1061, 1071 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978) (stating that the
availability of the fair use doctrine depends on all the circumstances surrounding the
use of copyrighted materials); Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d
1345, 1359 (Ct. Cl. 1973), affid per curiam by an equally divided court, 420 U.S. 376
(1975) (noting that the latitude for fair use is lessened to the extent Congress is ex-
plicit in defining the protection afforded to the copyright owner); Marvin Worth Prods.
v. Superior Films Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (holding that the
examination is both qualitative and quantitative); Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs.,
293 F. Supp. 130, 144-45 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (reaffirming the notion that courts must be
free to adopt the doctrine on a case-by-case basis).
129. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984).
130. Id. at 419-22.
131. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 432
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ment or vicarious liability.lss Sony insisted that a majority of copyright
holders made no objection to having private viewers "time-shift," rec-
ord their broadcasts for viewing at a later time.las Furthermore, Sony
demonstrated, through the use of testimony, that "time-shifting" did
not cause any harm to the potential market for, or the value of, the
plaintiffs' copyrighted works.' 38
A closely divided Supreme Court held that Sony was not a contribu-
tory infringer for two reasons. 87 First, the private home videotaping of
some programs is authorized. 138 Second, the copyright law exempts cer-
tain unauthorized copying under the fair use doctrine.'3"
The Court, however, had difficulty in deciding the case. This diffi-
culty is demonstrated by the 5-4 decision, the carry-over of the case to
a second term of the Court, and the need to hear reargument of the
issues.140 Sony thus signifies the inadequacy of the law in response to
developments of technology.1 41 Moreover, although the application of
the fair use doctrine to a technological advancement resolved the Sony
case, much uncertainty still remains. 42 One question is whether the
134. Id.
135. Id. at 436-38; see Clark, supra note 122, 455 n.25 (defining "time-shifting" as
the use of a home videotape recorder to record a broadcast program, for subsequent
viewing).
136. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony Corp. of America, 480 F. Supp. 429, 436-
38 (C.D. Cal. 1979), afj'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
137. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)
(Stevens, J., expressed the majority opinion; joined by Burger, Ch. J., Brennan, White,
and O'Connor, JJ., while Marshall, Powell, and Rehnquist, JJ. joined Blackmun, J., in
the dissent).
138. Id. at 444.
139. Id. at 454-55.
140. Leete, supra note 23, at 574.
141. Id.
142. See Fisher, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1661,
1661-95 (1988) (examining the need to formulate a better fair use doctrine). The opin-
ions of the Supreme Court do not prescribe a rule to govern future fair use controver-
sies. Id. at 1668. The Court notes that a fair use analysis is applicable on a case-by-
case basis. Id. Therefore, a fair use analysis is inherently flexible and precludes the
formulation of exact rules. Id. The Court, however, decided that lower courts should
consider the four factors, mentioned in section 107, when deciding whether a use is
fair. Id.
The majority of the Sony Court, focused the fair use analysis on the fourth factor
listed in section 107: the impact on the potential market factor. Id. at 1669. Lower
courts may have difficulty determining whether the fourth factor is violated in a partic-
ular case. Id. at 1672. A court will have to estimate the magnitude of damages caused
to plaintiff's market. Id. This is difficult because a court cannot always define the mar-
ket involved in the dispute. Id. at 1669-72.
Fisher believes that the fair use doctrine is filled with inherent defects. Id. at 1661-
95. The market impact test is not helpful because of the difficulty in determining dam-
ages. Id. at 1672. Furthermore, the Court has not determined what constitutes com-
mercial and noncommercial uses of protected works. Id. at 1672-74. Finally, the Court
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rationale applied in Sony is an appropriate means to resolve cases of
alleged copyright infringement that involve other technological
advances.
E. THE DAT CONTROVERSY
The American record industry hopes to resolve the DAT controversy
through negotiation, legislation, or litigation. 14 As noted earlier, the
industry is attempting to negotiate with Japanese manufacturers of
DATs and also lobbying Congress to pass legislation to mandate the
installation of copycode scanner chips. 44 These efforts have not pro-
duced a solution because the National Bureau of Standards concluded
that the chips were inadequate to prevent the recording of CDs onto
digital tape.'45 The Bureau found that the copycode scanner chips did
not always work, distorted sound, and were easily circumvented. 40
Despite this setback, the record industry is still committed to finding
a means to alleviate the recording threat of DAT.147 The industry sup-
ports placing a royalty on blank DAT tapes.1 48 In addition, the record
has failed to formulate a method of determining how much copying gives rise to liabil-
ity. Id. at 1675-78. Because of these defects, creators and users of intellectual works
are uncertain of their rights. Id. at 1693. Most importantly, the doctrine promotes a
society that is incapable of effectively resolving disputes in an orderly manner. Id. at
1694-95. Fisher concludes that the courts must reconstruct the fair use doctrine to
resolve these deficiencies. Id. at 1794.
143. See Plan to Bar CD Piracy is Called Inadequate, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1988,
at D2 (noting the statement of Jason S. Berman, President of the Recording Industry
Association of America, discussing possible resolutions to the DAT controversy).
144. See supra notes 9-12 and accompanying text (discussing the debate surround-
ing copycode).
145. Iversen, With Anti-Copy Chips Dead, a New DAT Battle is Brewing, ELEC-
TRONICS, Mar. 17, 1988, at 46-48. The National Bureau of Standards, after a five
month study, rejected the proposal of the record industry that requires copycode chips
in DAT recorders. Id.
146. Id. at 46.
147. Id. at 46-47. CBS Records leads the opposition to the introduction of DAT.
Koepp, Born in the U.S.A., Sold to Japan, TIME, Nov. 30, 1987, at 66. Sony, on the
other hand, supports DAT. Id. In 1987, Sony purchased CBS Records. Boyer, Sony
and CBS Records: What a Romance!, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1988, § 6 (Magazine), at
35-49. Sony wanted to combine the record, tape, and CD business of CBS Records
with its business of manufacturing equipment to play music. Id. at 40. Norio Ohga,
President and C.E.O. of Sony, states that Sony, in 1986, concluded that DAT would
gain acceptance in the American market if Sony owned the large catalogue of music
belonging to CBS Records. Id.
There is concern among the American record industry that Sony will not protect
CBS Records from DAT. Id. at 49. Walter Yetnikoff, head of CBS Records, believes
that Sony will seek a common solution to the DAT problem. Id. Akio Morita, co-
founder of Sony, suggests that Sony will eventually introduce DAT to the American
market at the proper moment. Id.
148. Iversen, supra note 145, at 48.
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industry proposes a system known as "unicopy" that prevents a DAT
recorder from making more than one copy of a prerecorded source. 4
The industry vows to sue manufacturers, vendors, and users of DATs
if they are introduced into the American market before a solution is
reached.50 This strategy is in response to the failure of the movie stu-
dios to sue Sony before the importation of the first videotape recorders
into the United States.'5 ' Because the videotape recorder had become a
staple article of commerce, the movie studios could not persuade the
Court in Sony to restrict home videotaping.
52
F. THE FAIR USE DocTRiN AND DAT
DAT does not raise a new or different home sound recording issue.0 3
DAT recorders essentially do not function differently from other re-
corders, because their principal use is for playback and for home sound
taping.15 Litigation concerning the legality of DAT sound recording
therefore evolves around the issue of whether home sound recording is
exempt from copyright liability under the fair use doctrine.""
The Court in Sony specifically noted the importance of section
107(4) of the 1976 Act, which provides that fair use can limit exclusive
rights.156 A fair use analysis, as applied to home sound recording, fo-
cuses on whether the act of home sound recording possesses a potential
149. Id.
150. See id. at 46 (noting statements of Jason S. Berman, President of the Record-
ing Industry of America, concerning possible litigation over the DAT controversy).
151. See J. LARDNER, supra note 7, at 17-32 (explaining the concerns of the attor-
neys for the movie studios in Sony). The attorneys agreed that the studios had to sue
Sony as soon as possible because a few thousand videotape recorders were already sold
in the United States. Id. at 20. The attorneys feared that they could not win the law-
suit if videotape recorders became too plentiful because courts would deem the video-
tape recorder a staple article of commerce and, would not restrict home videotaping.
Id.
152. See id. at 258-70 (discussing the decision in Sony). Lardner writes that the
majority of the Court viewed the videotape recorder as a staple article of commerce.
Id. at 264. Furthermore, Lardner concludes that Justice O'Connor's statements during
reargument suggest that the Court could "have decided the case on the staple article of
commerce question alone." Id. at 265.
153. See Hearings on H.R. 1384, supra note 9, at 92 (statement of Charles D.
Ferris) (comparing the home sound recording issue to the DAT controversy).
154. Id. at 98.
155. See Hearings on S. 506, supra note 9, at 29-30 (statement of Charles D.
Ferris) (stating that the controversy surrounding DAT is really a home sound recording
issue); see also supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text (explaining that the fair use
doctrine is applicable because home sound recording is not exempt under the 1976
Act).
156. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 US. 417, 451
(1984).
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effect on the market or the value of prerecorded tapes and records.1""
This analysis involves the rationale of the Court that section 107(4)
creates a presumption of harm to the copyright owner when the in-
fringing use is for commercial purposes.158 Conversely, when the in-
fringement is for noncommercial use, the Court requires the owner to
show proof of present harm or some meaningful likelihood of future
harm."'9
The application of section 107(4) to DAT sound recording results in
divergent sentiments from two interest groups. The first group, the Re-
cording Industry Association of America (RIAA),160 assumes a protec-
tionist attitude toward copyright. The RIAA asserts that audio copy-
right infringement causes, and will continue to create, severe economic
hardship for the sound recording industry.16 The RIAA contends that
home taping significantly displaces the revenues of the record industry
because people are taping, rather than buying, prerecorded music.16 '
Moreover, the RIAA argues that the principal impact of DAT technol-
ogy will inevitably further reduce sales of prerecorded products. 6 3
The second interest group, the Home Recording Rights Coalition
(HRRC),'16 opposes the RIAA position. The HRRC believes that
"consumers have, and deserve, the right to purchase new consumer
home recorders and to tape at home for personal use."'' 65 The HRRC
rejects the economic hardship argument and emphasizes that the re-
cording industry is more profitable than ever, and that record compa-
nies are experiencing profits superior to any ever attained.1 66 According
to the HRRC, this resurgence is possibly related to home taping.167
Finally, the HRRC asserts that home taping of prerecorded materi-
als is a noncommercial private use. This use is described as making
157. Copyrights, 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1982).
158. Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451
(1982).
159. Id.
160. Hearings at H.R. 1384, supra note 9, at 33 (statement of Jason S. Berman)(defining the RIAA as including companies that produce and market about 90% of the
prerecorded music sold in the United States).
161. Id. at 33-49; see supra notes 107-21 and accompanying text (noting the his-
tory concerning the controversy of home taping).
162. Hearings at H.R. 1384, supra note 9, at 33-49.
163. Id. at 46.
164. See id. at 89 n.1 (defining the HRRC as including companies that manufac-
ture, sell, and distribute audio cassette recorders and audio tapes, and related equip-
ment). Membership also includes trade associations and consumer groups. Id.
165. Id. at 91.
166. Id. at 92.
167. Id.
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copies that are listened to in a more convenient place.10 8 This practice,
"place-shifting," is analogous, it is argued, to the concept of "time-
shifting" put forth in Sony and thereby legitimizes the unauthorized
duplication of copyrighted materials.169
A resolution to the debate is not imminent. The arguments of both
the RIAA and the HRRC are based on unsubstantiated allegations re-
garding the fair use issue of whether DAT poses a present or future
harm to the recording industry. The lack of a resolution concerning
DAT exemplifies the confusion pervading the present state of American
copyright law. The confusion produces a system that is unable to pro-
vide the developers of new technologies definite guidelines concerning
potential liability for copyright infringement. This is because, histori-
cally, American copyright law lagged behind technology.170 A new
technology, such as DAT, is therefore necessary to hasten the next revi-
sion of the copyright law. A revision is essential to clarify potential
liability for copyright infringement, and to promote cooperation and
participation with foreign countries in the field of international
copyright.17 1
To effectuate this revision, the United States Congress must examine
successful copyright systems around the world to come up with a solu-
tion to resolve the weaknesses of its own copyright law. Due to its un-
derlying ideological rationale, one of flexibility, the Japanese copyright
system represents a suitable model."7 2 With its ideological foundation,
Japan effectively adjusts to the rapid changes in technology.17 3
II. JAPANESE COPYRIGHT SYSTEM
The ideological foundation of the Japanese copyright system is based
168. Hearings on S. 506, supra note 9, at 31 (statement of Charles D. Ferris).
Ferris explained that home taping is about listening to music from wherever it is most
convenient, whether from one's car stereo or from one's personal stereo. Id.
169. Id.
170. Hearings on H.R. 1384, supra note 9, at 31 (statement of Jason S. Berman).
171. See Comment, Domestic Barriers, supra note 81, at 83-85 (discussing the
lack of American participation in international copyright conventions).
172. See MASAAKIRA KATSUMOTO, THE NEW JAPANESE COPYRIGHT LAW 121
(1975) (explaining the basic purpose behind Japanese copyright law). Japanese copy-
right law attempts to satisfy three demands: (1) the promotion of the arts; (2) the
protection of those who serve to disseminate the works to the public, but only insofar as
such protection does not conflict with protecting the rights of the author, and (3) the
public interest. Id.
173. See id. at 122 (noting that the main task of the Japanese copyright system is
to reconcile the turmoil caused by conflicting interests in an advanced technological
age). Furthermore, Japanese law is also intended to meet the requirements of contem-
porary cultural life. Id.
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on the continental European system.1 4 The underlying principle of
Japanese law is natural justice.17 Natural justice provides that the
right in the work attaches at the act of personal creation. 17 6 This prin-
ciple is based on the rationale that the author is, in essence, a creator
of a work.'7 Consequently, the author, similar to other creators, is en-
titled to compensation for his or her efforts.'
Unlike the Anglo-Saxon system,'17  which focuses on the proprietary
right and subordinates the personal right of the author, 80 the Japanese
system emphasizes two facets.' 8 ' First, the system premises much of its
copyright law on the notion that the author is entitled to the fruits of
his or her labor. 82 The result attained is that authors acquire a prop-
erty right in the work.'8 3 This right gives the author a right to exploit
his work economically.184 Second, the Japanese system recognizes a
personal right in a work.' 85 This right acknowledges that the work pos-
sesses an intellectual and personal link with the author. 86 This per-
sonal right permits authors to publish their works or not as they wish,
when they wish, and in the form they wish. 87 Moreover, the authors
174. See id. at 117-18 (stating that German and French copyright laws formed the
original basis for Japanese copyright law); see also S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 6
(explaining the basis behind the continental European system). The system is essen-
tially individualistic. Id. The right in the work exists from the act of creation. Id. The
work, in essence, represents the personality of the author. Id. This link with the author
remains throughout the existence of the work. Id. The notion of individualism, that is
integrated in the European system, is not the basis of the Anglo-Saxon system which
emphasizes the economics behind the promotion of creativity. Id. at 7-10.
175. See S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 3 (explaining the principle of natural jus-
tice). Under the concept of natural justice, authors are guaranteed royalties for the
their work. Id.
176. Id. at 6-7.
177. Id. at 3.
178. Id.
179. See id. at 7-10 (noting that this system of protection developed in Great
Britain).
180. See id. (stating that the Anglo-Saxon system grants an author a monopoly in
his or her work). The system is based on the belief that potential profit fosters an
increase in creativity. Id.
181. See id. at 6-7 (noting that the European system grants both an economic and
personal right in a work).
182. See id. at 6 (describing the rights accorded under the European copyright
system).
183. Id. The author's property right in a work arises at creation. Id.
184. Id.
185. See id. at 6-7 (discussing the origin of personal rights). Personal rights usually
exist for 50 years after the death of the author. Id. To protect the author, the right is
inalienable. Id. at 7. In addition, compulsory licenses restrict the right in only excep-
tional circumstances. Id. Finally, only an individual and not a company or corporation
can create the right. Id.
186. Id.
187. See id. (noting that personal rights are a natural right). Therefore, in theory,
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may defend their work against any distortion or abuse.18
A. RATIONALE BEIHN THE JAPANESE COPYRIGHT LAW OF 1970
The Japanese government enacted its current copyright law in
1970.189 The Japanese government protects not only the copyright and
personal rights of its authors, but also the author's "neighboring
rights," which are limited rights analogous to copyright.190 Because of
this, many commentators regard the Japanese law as one of the most
advanced copyright statutes in the world.""'
Although the Japanese copyright system is based on the European
system, Japan balances the rights of the copyright owner and the rea-
sonable demands of the public differently. The Japanese system of per-
sonal rights de-emphasizes the individualism of an author's right in a
work. Instead, Japanese copyright law emphasizes the idea that works
form a considerable national asset.19 2 Hence, the law, through the rec-
ognition of personal rights, attempts to further encourage and reward
creativity that contributes to the development of the national culture.19 3
the right is absolute and unrestricted. Id.
188. Id.
189. Japanese Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted In 2 COPYRIGHT
LAWS, supra note 81.
190. TERUO DOi, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW OF JAPAN 201 (1980) [here-
inafter Doi, LAW or JAPAN]; see also infra notes 199-224 and accompanying text
(providing a general discussion on neighboring rights).
191. Doi, LAW OF JAPAN, supra note 190, at 201; see Teruo Doi, Japanese Copy-
right Protection, 29 J. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S. AM. 367, 368 (1982) [hereinafter Doi,
Japanese Copyright Protection] (noting that the Japanese copyright system incorpo-
rated many facets from other copyright systems around the world).
192. See S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 3 (explaining that the development of
culture is one of four justifications of a copyright system); see also MAsMAKRA KATsu-
MOTO, supra note 172, at 121-23 (noting that article 1 of the 1970 Copyright Law
emphasizes the development of Japanese culture). Article 1 states in pertinent part that
the purpose of this law is to secure the protection of the rights of authors, and to
contribute to the development of culture. Id. at 121. See R. CHRISTOPHER, THE JAPA-
NESE MIND 193-210 (1983) (noting that information is viewed as a cultural asset in
Japanese society). The Japanese possess the belief that the attainment of knowledge is
of paramount importance. Id. at 207. Christopher states that Japanese enthusiasm for
information is comparable to no other contemporary society. Id. at 193. For example,
books play a more important role in Japan than in either the United States or Europe.
Id. at 193-94. Approximately 35,000 new books are published each year in Japan. Id.
at 194. In per capita terms, Japanese publishers print nearly twice as many books as
American publishers. Id.
193. Supra note 192; see S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 7-10 (noting the basis of
the Anglo-Saxon system). The underlying philosophies of both the Japanese and An-
glo-Saxon systems are to promote creativity. Id.
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B. ARTICLE 30: THE FAIR USE DOCTRINE UNDER JAPANESE LAW
The policy of the Japanese government to foster creation and pro-
mote the national culture is achieved through emphasizing the public
right to gain access to information. Accordingly, the exclusive rights
granted the authors are subject to a number of limitations. These limi-
tations are codified in the Japanese Copyright Law of 1970 as exemp-
tions to certain uses of an author's works from copyright liability.19 4
Article 30,195 which parallels the American copyright doctrine of fair
use, illustrates the limitations placed on the monopoly rights of an au-
thor in Japan.196 The exemption is particularly broad. Article 30 pro-
vides that one may reproduce an author's copyrighted work for the pur-
pose of personal use at one's home or within a similarly limited
circle.197 Under this provision, it does not matter what kind of instru-
ment or method is used when the reproduction occurs in an individual's
home."98
C. JAPAN AND NEIGHBORING RIGHTS
The integration of neighboring rights is a direct consequence of the
broad nature of the fair use doctrine in Japanese copyright law.,"9
Neighboring rights provide a broader base of compensation for the ex-
ploitation of a creator's work.200 Adequate compensation is achieved
194. Doi, LAW OF JAPAN, supra note 190, at 217. These limitations are provided in
articles 30-50, which include chapter II, Rights of Authors, section 3, Contents of
Rights, subsection 5, Limitations of Copyright. Id.
195. Japanese Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT
LAWS, supra note 81, art. 30. This article exempts certain acts of reproduction for
private use. Id. Article 30 provides:
It shall be permissible for the user to reproduce by himself a work forming the
subject matter of a copyright for the purpose of his personal use, family use or
other similar uses within a limited circle, except in the case where such reproduc-
tion is made by means of automatic reproducing machines ("automatic reproduc-
ing machine" means a machine having reproducing functions and in which all or
main parts of reproducing devices are automatic) placed for the public.
Id.
196. See id. (noting the balancing in Japanese law between public access to works
and a creator's right to control his or her work).
197. Id.
198. See supra note 195 (noting that the public use of an automatic reproducing
machine is the only means of private copying that is prohibited).
199. See S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 174-78 (explaining the concept of neigh-
boring rights); see also supra note 195 (describing the Japanese fair use doctrine).
200. See MASAAKIRA KATSUMOTO, supra note 172, at 122 (noting that the 1970
Act grants the right to performers, broadcasting organizations, and record producers to
receive compensation for their efforts in presenting the works of authors to the public).
Neighboring Rights are covered in chapter IV of the 1970 Act, sections 1-7, articles
89-104. Id.
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through granting rights that are similar to those rights protected under
copyright law.201 Neighboring rights, however, are not as exclusive be-
cause they are usually rights applicable to derivative works. 2°a Conse-
quently, the scope of the neighboring rights is confined to the reproduc-
tion right, the performance right, and the broadcasting right.203 For
example, under the concept of neighboring rights, performers possess
the right to receive royalties from radio and television broadcasts of
sound recordings.2 ' Although the provisions of the Japanese copyright
system are modeled after the Rome Convention,0 5 the Japanese rights
are more extensive than those that other nations grant.200
Article 89 states that:
(1) Performers shall enjoy the rights mentioned in Article 91, paragraph (1),
Article 92, paragraph (1) and Article 95bis, paragraph (1) as well as the right to
secondary use fees mentioned in Article 95, paragraph (1) and the right to remu-
neration in Article 95bis, paragraph (3).
(2) Producers of phonograms shall enjoy the right mentioned in Article 96, para-
graph (1) and Article 97bis, paragraph (1) as well as the right to secondary use
fees mentioned in Article 97, paragraph (1) and the right to remuneration men-
tioned in Article 97bis, paragraph (3).
(3) Broadcasting organizations shall enjoy the rights mentioned in Articles 98 to
100.
(4) Wire diffusion organizations shall enjoy the rights mentioned in Articles
lOObis to 100quater.
(5) The enjoyment of the rights referred to in any of the preceding paragraphs
shall not be subject to any formality.
(6) The rights referred to in paragraphs (1) to (4) (except the right to secondary
use fees and the right to remuneration referred to in paragraphs (1) and (2))
shall be called "neighboring rights."
Japanese Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT LAws, supra
note 81, art. 89; see Doi, Japanese Copyright Protection, supra note 191, at 369 (stat-
ing that another characteristic of Japanese copyright law is that it provides a separate
chapter for the protection of performers, manufacturers of phonograph records, and
broadcasting organizations); see also MASAAKIRA KATsuMOTO, supra note 172, at 148-
50 (noting that the 1970 Act recognizes the concept of neighboring rights); Yoshio
Nomura, Japan, in S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 609-14 (same); Doi, LAW OF JA-
PAN, supra note 190, at 238-55 (same).
201. See S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 180 (noting the scope of neighboring
rights).
202. See id. at 178 (noting that neighboring rights presuppose a pre-existing work).
The concept of neighboring rights usually applies to works based on a previous work.
Id. Thus, performers are granted protection only if they perform a pre-existing vork.
Id. Phonograms and broadcasts are nearly always based on pre-existing works and
hence the neighboring rights doctrine grants them protection. Id.
203. See supra notes 199-202 and accompanying text (explaining the concept of
neighboring rights).
204. See generally 2 COPYRIGHT LAWS, supra note 81 (reprinting the laws of as
many as 58 countries that recognize performers' rights in sound recordings).
205. See supra note 86 (discussing performance rights).
206. See Yoshio Nomura, Japan, in S. STEWART, supra note 33, at 609 (noting
that under Japanese law performers, broadcasters, and wire diffusion organizations are
granted secondary rights in the uses of works); Japanese Copyright Law, Law No. 48
of 1970, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT LAWS, supra note 81, arts. 95, 97 (noting that the
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The rights accorded under the Japanese system are predicated on the
recognition of an author's personal right and proprietary right."' The
acknowledgment of two separate rights provides the works of creators
with protection under a proprietary right, a personal right, or both. Ac-
cordingly, the Japanese copyright system extends protection to produc-
ers and performers of sound recordings.20 8 These protections, while not
incorporating personal rights, do grant proprietary rights to accommo-
date advances in recording technology. 09
1. Protection of Performers
Japanese law defines performers as those who perform literary and
artistic works as well as those who perform different types of entertain-
ment. 10 Protection under neighboring rights extends to recording,
broadcasting, and wire diffusion of performances."1 In addition, the
secondary use of phonograms is dealt with in articles 95 and 97 of the Japanese Copy-
right Law of 1970). These articles define secondary use as follows:
Article 95(1) (secondary use of commercial phonograms) defines the principle of
secondary use:
When broadcasting organizations and wire diffusion organizations .... have
broadcast or diffused by wire commercial phonograms incorporating perform-
ances with the authorization of the owner of the right mentioned in Article 91,
paragraph (1) (except broadcast or wire diffusion made upon receiving such
broadcasts or wire diffusions), they shall pay secondary use fees to the perform-
ers whose performances (in which neighboring rights subsist) have been so
broadcast or diffused by wire.
Id. art. 95(1).
Article 97(1) (secondary use of commercial phonograms) defines the principle of
secondary use:
When broadcasting organizations, etc. have broadcast or diffused by wire com-
mercial phonograms (except broadcast or wire diffusion made upon receiving
such broadcasts or wire diffusions), they shall pay secondary use fees to the pro-
ducers whose phonograms (which are mentioned in Article 8, item (i) or (ii) and
in which neighboring rights subsist) have been so broadcast or diffused by wire.
Id. art. 97(1).
207. See Doi, LAW OF JAPAN, supra note 190, at 206-11 (stating that the Japanese
copyright system provides both personal and economic rights protection). Personal
rights are covered in articles 18-20 of the 1970 Act. Id. at 206. Economic rights are
covered in articles 21-28 of the 1970 Act. Id. at 210-11.
208. Japanese Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted in 2 CoPYRIGHT
LAWS, supra note 81, arts. 89-104.
209. See Doi, LAW OF JAPAN, supra note 190, at 242-43 (noting that Japanese law
does not provide performers with personal rights). Tort remedies are available against
defamation. Id. at 243. A performer can prove defamation if adequate distortion or
unauthorized change of a performance is shown. Id.
210. Japanese Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT
LAWS, supra note 81, art. 2(l)(iii-iv). The law defines performers as actors, dancers,
musicians, singers, others who give a performance of work, and those who conduct or
direct a performance. Id.
211. Id. arts. 91, 92, and 2(l)(ixbis) (noting that wire diffusion means wire trans-
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performer's right in the recording extends to the reproduction of the
recording.212
Article 91(1) provides performers with the exclusive right to make
sound or visual recordings of their live performances. 1 3 In effect, arti-
cle 91(1) requires the performer's authorization before making sound
or visual recordings of the performer's performance. 14 The article in-
cludes the recording of live performances, as well as the recording of
performances which are broadcasted or transmitted to the public.210
Accordingly, reproduction of sound recordings that are made without
authorization from the artist, as well as reproduction for a purpose in-
consistent with the performer's authorization, infringes upon the per-
former's rights under Japanese law.216
2. Protection of Record Producers
Record producers include those who first record and market a re-
cording. 17 Under article 91(1), a record producer may reproduce re-
cordings with the authorization of the performer as long as the repro-
duction is within the scope of the authorization.218 Although this
mission intended for public reception).
To promote broadcasting activities and, at the same time, protect the interests of
performers, Japanese copyright law regulates the relationship between performers and
broadcasting organizations. Doi, LAW OF JAPAN, supra note 190, at 243. This system
of interest balancing is incorporated in article 93, article 94, and article 95. Japanese
Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT LAws, supra note 81,
arts. 93-95. Article 93 permits a broadcasting organization to make recordings of a
performer's authorized performance for broadcasting purposes. Id. art. 93(1). Article
94 allows the broadcasters to broadcast the recordings alluded to in article 93. Id. art.
94(1). Finally, through mandating the payment of royalties for those recordings broad-
casted in accordance with article 94, article 95 protects the interests of performers. Id.
art. 95(1). Each provision requires the broadcasting organization to obtain the per-
former's authorization before conveying a performer's work to the public. Id. In addi-
tion, under certain circumstances, the broadcasting organization must pay a reasonable
amount of compensation to the performer and the producer of records. Id. arts. 95(l)-
97(1).
212. Japanese Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGIT




216. See Doi, LAW OF JAPAN, supra note 190, at 241-42 (noting cases that held
that copyright protection extends to the reproduction of sound recordings); see also
Hamasaka v. lshiyama Kaden K.K., Tokkyo To Kigyoo Jan. 1979, 64 (Tokyo Dist.
Ct., Nov. 8, 1978), cited in Doi, LAW OF JAPAN, supra note 190, at 241-42 (holding
the defendant guilty of copyright infringement when defendant made and sold cassette
tapes that copied a cassette tape of plaintiffs' performance).
217. Japanese Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGH1T
LAWs, supra note 81, art. 2(1)(vi).
218. Id. arts. 96, 97.
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reproduction is not deemed a work of authorship, copyright law,
through neighboring rights, grants the reproduced recording protec-
tion.219 The granting of this right is predicated upon the recognition of
the creative element in the recording of sound.22°
The producer's exclusive right to reproduce recordings extends to the
right to broadcast or to a public performance.2 21 This right, however,
only entitles the producers to receive payment for the secondary use of
the recordings.222 Moreover, only those broadcasting organizations and
wire diffusion organizations 223 that principally broadcast music must
pay the royalties.224
D. THE JAPANESE ACCEPTANCE OF DAT
Although the scope of protection and subject matter accorded under
the Japanese copyright system is extensive,225 the Japanese Copyright
Law of 1970 does not explicitly exempt home sound recording of copy-
righted works from copyright liability.228 Instead, Japanese law gener-
ally exempts home reproduction of copyrighted works under article
30.227 Despite the lack of an exemption, the introduction of DAT into
Japan does not foster much debate regarding home sound recording. 2 8
219. Id. This follows from the concept of neighboring rights, which recognizes cer-
tain author's rights in individuals who are not original creators. See S. STEWART, supra
note 33, at 177-78 (explaining the concept of neighboring rights).
220. Doi, LAW OF JAPAN, supra note 190, at 244-46; see S. STEWART, supra note
33, at 177-87 (noting that the underlying rationale of the European system emphasizes
the notion that protection springs forth at the moment of creation).
221. See Japanese Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT
LAWS, supra note 81, art. 96 (examining the exclusive right to reproduce records).
222. Id.
223. See supra note 211 and accompanying text (describing the definition of wire
diffusion).
224. Japanese Copyright Law, Law No. 48 of 1970, reprinted in 2 COPYRIGHT
LAWS, supra note 81, art. 97.
225. Supra notes 189-193 and accompanying text.
226. See supra note 195 and accompanying text (noting the general exemption of
certain home reproductions).
227. See 2 COPYRIGHT LAWS, supra note 81, art. 30 (noting that most types of
home reproduction for personal use are exempt under the Japanese fair use doctrine).
228. See Sony, Sharp Set to Start Selling DATs, The Japan Times Weekly Over-
seas Edition, Mar. 14, 1987, at 6 (stating that in March of 1987 the Japanese electron-
ics industry began to market DATs in Japan); see also Tai Kawabata, Tokyo Com-
pany to Market Tapes for DAT Recorders, The Japan Times Weekly Overseas
Edition, Feb. 6, 1988, at 11 (noting marketing of prerecorded DAT tapes in Japan).
See Takashi Kitazume, DAT Sales Slow in First Year as Dispute Over Copyright
Drags On, The Japan Times Weekly Overseas Edition, Mar. 19, 1988, at 11 (noting
the protest from both abroad and in Japan). Sales of DATs are below expectations. Id.
Makers have exported DATs to Europe, but have not begun exporting to the United
States for fear of provoking of anti-Japanese sentiment and promoting legislation that
would ban DAT imports. Id. The Japanese Society for Rights of Authors, Composers
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This is because the Japanese system maintains an equitable balance
between the owners of copyrighted works and public access to works."'
DAT does not pose a significant threat because Japanese law provides
owners of a wide variety of works with adequate compensation.e 0
CONCLUSION
The introduction of the DAT illustrates the inherent defects of the
American copyright system. The individuals traditionally granted copy-
right protection use the author's personal rights as an argument to ex-
tend the author's proprietary rights. This argument, however, is incon-
sistent with the history of copyright and engenders a very rigid
copyright system. The realization of both a proprietary right and a per-
sonal right resolves this conflict. The realization allows broader copy-
right protection that extends to performances of sound recordings.
Moreover, it enables the United States to join the Rome Convention
and, in turn, provides domestic recording companies and artists with
increased economic benefits. Finally, such an approach provides the
American copyright system with needed flexibility.
Although the ideological foundation of the American copyright sys-
tem differs from the Japanese system, the United States can still adopt
the flexibility of Japanese copyright law. Such an adoption is possible
because both systems profess a philosophy that the function of copy-
right is to benefit society through the promotion of creativity. Congress
therefore should finally recognize that two rights, a personal right and
a proprietary right, merit equal protection under American copyright
law. This acknowledgement will expand the scope of copyright protec-
tion because it provides the creator of a work protection under either or
both a proprietary right and a personal right. With the recognition of
two distinct rights, American law is permitted to grant copyright pro-
tection to those works of creators that do not possess elements of per-
sonal right. The American copyright system thus adopts a more flexible
and Publishers adopted the argument of the American music industry that record sale
revenues have decreased yearly because of widespread home copying. Id. The belief is
that the Japanese record industry will collapse without the introduction of a system for
compensating the record companies for home taping. Id. The Electronics Industries
Association of Japan contends that the current prosperity of the music industry is owed
to past developments of higher-quality audio equipment. Id. Finally, European elec-
tronics makers are attempting to restrain possible Japanese attempts to market world-
wide DATs without copy-guards. Id.
229. See supra note 192 and accompanying text (explaining the underlying philoso-
phy of the Japanese copyright system).
230. See supra notes 199-224 and accompanying text (noting the employment of
the concept of neighboring rights).
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scheme under which it grants protection to works. Creative works such
as performances would become integrated within the scope of copyright
protection and provide other individuals, not only authors, with a
method of compensation for their efforts. Consequently, the fiction that
copyright protection is accorded only to the author of an original work
is destroyed.
A system recognizing these rights could avoid the upheaval sur-
rounding DAT. An extension of protection would offset the loss of po-
tential revenue from such an advance in recording technology. In this
way, a balance is achieved between the concept of copyright and tech-
nology. In the end, society benefits from the wonders of uninhibited
creativity and innovation.
